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Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100040004-9

Draft

2 October 1968
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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Continuance of CIA Capability to Conduct
Overhead Reconnaissance

1. The purpose of this paper is to state the fundamental reasons which impel me to recommend that CIA maintain its capability and continue to discharge developmental and operational responsibilities in overhead reconnaissance. In presenting this case it is not possible to ignore the existence of a National Reconnaissance Office and indeed it is the fact that there is a NRO that makes it mandatory to discuss this issue. It is not proposed, however, to argue here the merits of the NRO issue. It is proposed to develop the thesis that until such time that the issue of NRO is satisfactorily resolved it would be inimical to the best interests of the National Security of the U. S. Government to have CIA voluntarily withdraw from responsible participation in the development and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program.

2. It might be useful to present the case for the continuing maintenance of a CIA capability and participating role in the National Reconnaissance Program by stating certain very basic facts without elaborate supporting historical detail or justification. The pertinent facts, as I see them, are these:

a. The CIA, unlike the military departments of the Department of Defense, views the collection and production of intelligence as its Congressionally chartered and primary purpose for existence. The military departments are primarily responsible for the deterrence of war and, should that deterrence fail, the successful engagement with and defeat of the enemy and the maintenance of the security of the U. S. Intelligence, therefore, to the military departments is a means to an end. In CIA intelligence is the end product.

b. An objective interpretation of the historical development of aerial reconnaissance of denied areas leads to the inescapable conclusion that the creation of this capability reflects credit solely upon the CIA. This fact does not diminish the credit for the supporting role of the military services, primarily the USAF, nor does it depreciate their great contributions to follow-on programs which have succeeded the original manned vehicle capability developed by the CIA.

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c. The Congressional charter given to the CIA, and the supplemental Directives issued by the National Security Council charge the CIA with the conduct of espionage. Neither the Congressional statutes nor the Executive Directives limit the conduct of espionage to any particular environment.

d. The dramatic and significant value of intelligence acquired by overhead reconnaissance has been so sufficiently established that any failure of organization or command structure within this Government that allows for the further development and conduct of the program at less than maximum capability is clearly fraught with inestimable danger.

3. The issue before us then is whether it is wise at this time to permit the CIA to withdraw voluntarily from responsibilities of a developmental and operational nature in the conduct of the program. The significance of the issue comes about because responsible offices of the Agency are intellectually convinced that there exist serious deficiencies in both substance and organization in the current concepts, structure and operational responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office. These reservations are well known to you and need not be repeated here. It should be stated here however that during my tenure as DD/S&T the intensity and frequency of discussions on these deficiencies has materially accelerated without any concomitant correction or amelioration of the basic issues involved.

4. It is particularly germane to note at this juncture that the prosecution of that portion of the National Reconnaissance Plan delegated to the USAF by the DNRO is possible only by utilization of Congressional authority given to the Director of Central Intelligence. The Congressional authority involved is the right to expend funds for confidential purposes without an audit of such funds by the General Accounting Office; i.e., confidential or unvouchered funds. Only the Congress can authorize this unique authority. While it is true in theory that the Department of Defense could seek and be granted this authority to expend funds in the magnitude necessary to assume complete financial responsibility in its name for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program, the willingness of Congress to so authorize and the length of time involved for DOD to obtain this authority are very pertinent to the issue. Likewise pertinent to the issue and in a sense emanating from the historic right of the DCI to utilize confidential funds in the conduct of his operations is the dynamism and the opportunity of the exercise of imagination that this facility has developed in the CIA. This is not to say that a parallel dynamic climate could not be created in the magnitude necessary. However, it appears reasonable to assume that the systems of review of expenditures of unvouchered funds that the Defense establishment would

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predictably impose upon a fourth or fifth echelon organization such as NRO would by their very existence tend to negate the dynamism and flexibility that such authority should bring about.

5. I believe it also essential that an appreciation be had of our capability to insure the continuity of personnel in developing and managing these programs as well as the operational support apparatus that has been created to insure a most efficient and quick response capability. This operational support capability, which includes covert financing, the security protecting such finance as well as the security that envelops the entire development and operational program, the worldwide control and instantaneous communications network, are all to a great degree the result of the capability of CIA to insure the continuity of personnel assignment on a program basis. That this apparatus has been built to its current level of efficiency in a ten year period and its current level of efficiency is due in no small degree to the continuity of assignment of senior Agency civilian personnel in OSA and its predecessors. These individuals have had the opportunity to learn by experience and to constantly feed back into the apparatus the lessons of history and experience thereby making that apparatus continually more viable and responsive. I rather question the wisdom of taking any step at this time which would involve the dismantling of the apparatus and the dispersal of the personnel assets dedicated to this program until we possess a greater assurance and a more clear picture of what the level of performance of the development and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program would be if it were the sole responsibility of the DOD.

6. Let me assure you that my reservations on the wisdom of a possible CIA withdrawal from the development and operational aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program are entirely divorced from any considerations of bureaucracy or status of CIA within the intelligence community. I do not view this issue as either a jurisdictional squabble or as an example of the games of missions and roles so often played in the military establishment. My concern is primarily based on a demonstrated need to serve the National Security interests of the U. S. by having available to this Government an overhead reconnaissance facility that represents the highest state of the art. I am convinced by a study of the development of this art within the Government that such art would neither exist nor would it be intelligently and dynamically pursued were it not for the past and current role of the CIA. I am not persuaded by my experiences with NRO to date that it is yet sufficiently postured in substance or organization to assure me that it is prepared to accept and develop further with no loss of efficiency and performance this most vital responsibility.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr Scoville

Handwritten initials

This memo was shown to [REDACTED] and he was requested to keep an eye on the subject.

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He indicated that the recently approved policy on this matter required NRO approval for any further releases of information.

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[REDACTED] will inform [REDACTED] that we wish to be apprised of any contact on this subject.

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Handwritten signature
EBG 7/12/62
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Executive Registry

62-4805

11 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/R

7/17/62
DDCI

The DCI is concerned about the proposal by the Department of State to advise certain countries about broad aspects of our satellite reconnaissance program. The DCI requests that you follow this matter carefully with both State and Defense and keep this office advised.

The DCI intends to discuss this with you and Gilpatric.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 16 July 62
TO: DDCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: Forwarded per request. <i>Return to</i> <i>↓</i>		
FROM: O/DD/R		
ROOM NO. 3E14	BUILDING Hqs	EXTENSION 7713

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957—O-439445

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7/11/62		7/11/62		ER-62-4805	
DATE OF DOC.	DATE REC'D	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING	
7/11/62	7/11/62				
TO [REDACTED]				ROUTING	
FROM [REDACTED]				DATE SENT	
SUBJ. Proposal by the Department of State to advise certain Countries about broad aspects of our satellite reconnaissance program.				7/11/62	
1-Cy					
COURIER NO.		ANSWERED		NO REPLY	
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SEC. CL.		ORIGIN		CONTROL NO.	
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DATE OF DOC.	DATE REC'D	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING	
7/11/62	7/17/62				
TO DD/R				ROUTING	
FROM O [REDACTED]				DATE SENT	
SUBJ. DCI concern of State Dept to advise certain countries about broad aspects of our satellite reconnaissance program. DCI Requests that this matter be followed carefully and R kept informed.				7/17/62	
1 Cy					
COURIER NO.		ANSWERED		NO REPLY	
				3	